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Abstract In a facility game one or more facilities are placed in a metric space to
serve a set of selfish agents whose addresses are their private information. In a clas-
sical facility game, each agent wants to be as close to a facility as possible, and the
cost of an agent can be defined as the distance between her location and the closest
facility. In an obnoxious facility game, each agent wants to be far away from all
facilities, and her utility is the distance from her location to the facility set. The ob-
jective of each agent is to minimize her cost or maximize her utility. An agent may
lie if, by doing so, more benefit can be obtained. We are interested in social choice
mechanisms that do not utilize payments. The game designer aims at a mechanism
that is strategy-proof, in the sense that any agent cannot benefit by misreporting
her address, or, even better, group strategy-proof, in the sense that any coalition of
agents cannot all benefit by lying. Meanwhile, it is desirable to have the mechanism
to be approximately optimal with respect to a chosen objective function. Several
models for such approximation mechanism design without money for facility games
have been proposed. In this paper we briefly review these models and related results
for both deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and meanwhile we present a
general framework for approximation mechanism design without money for facility
games.
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1 Introduction
Algorithmic mechanism design [19] deals with game-theoretic versions of optimiza-
tion problems such as task scheduling, resource allocation, facility location, etc.
which involve one or more selfish agents who are asked to report their private infor-
mation as part of the input. A mechanism is a function that receives the information
reported by the agents, and returns an outcome possibly together with a payment
scheme. An agent might lie about her information if doing so increases her own
benefit obtained from the outcome of the game. The goal is to design a mechanism
that encourages truthfulness or strategy-proofness on the one hand and optimizes a
related objective function on the other hand.
In mechanism design with money, the authority can use money as compensation
to the agents in order to ensure strategy-proofness. For example, the well known
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [24] is not only strategy-proof, but also
outputs an optimal solution to the problem of maximizing the sum of all agents’
utility. However, a disadvantage [28] of this mechanism is that it must return an op-
timal solution for a given objective function. Since it is often difficult to compute
an optimal solution in polynomial time for many combinatorial optimization prob-
lems, sometimes the VCG mechanism is not efficient. Meanwhile, as pointed out by
Schummer and Vohra [30], “there are many important environments where money
cannot be used as a medium of compensation, due to ethical considerations (for
instance, in political decision making) or legal considerations (for instance, in the
context of organ donations)”. Therefore, many researchers are interested in mecha-
nisms without monetary payment.
Procaccia and Tennecholtz [27] first proposed that approximation can be used
to obtain strategy-proofness without relying on payment and initiated a case study
in approximation mechanism design without money based on facility games. Since
then many results have been obtained by various authors on approximation mech-
anism design without money for facility games. The purpose of this paper is to
give a brief review of known results in this area and meanwhile present a general
framework based on existing models. This framework will be discussed in the next
section. In Sections 3 and 4, we will give an account of results on different models
for classical facility games and obnoxious facility games, respectively. In Section 5
we discuss possible research problems in the area.
2 Framework
In any facility game there associates a set N = {1,2, . . . ,n} of agents, where i de-
notes the ith agent. There is also an underlying metric space (Ω ,d) whose points
are called locations, where as usual the metric (distance function) d : Ω ×Ω →R is
non-negative, symmetric and satisfies the triangle inequality. Each agent i ∈ N has a
true location ti ∈Ω that is her private information, and she reports a location xi ∈Ω
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that is not necessarily the same as ti. We call x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xm) ∈ Ω n a location
profile.
Assume that k locations in Ω are required to be selected to put k facilities. A
deterministic mechanism f outputs k facility locations in Ω according to a given
location profile x without resorting to payments. In other words, f is a function
f : Ω n → Ω(k), where Ω(k) is the family of non-empty subsets of Ω of cardinality
at most k, and f (x) is the set of locations chosen for x by f where facilities will be
put.
Given a mechanism f , each agent i has a utility u( f (x), ti) whose value relies
on her true location ti and the output f (x). Since each agent is selfish, she will try
her best to maximize her utility. It may be possible for an agent to manipulate the
outcome of a mechanism to obtain more benefit by misreporting her location. There-
fore, from a game-theoretic perspective, an important goal is to design mechanisms
that are strategy-proof (SP), in the sense that no agent can ever benefit from report-
ing a false location regardless of the strategies of other agents. Sometimes we may
wish to design mechanisms that are even group strategy-proof (GSP), in the sense
that whenever a coalition of agents lies, at least one of the members of the coalition
does not gain extra benefit from the deviation.
In approximation mechanism design, we are interested in (group) strategy-proof
mechanisms that are approximately optimal with respective to a given objective
function, where approximation is understood in the usual sense by looking at the
worst-case ratio between the optimal objective value and the value of the mecha-
nisms solution to the underlying maximization problem. Based on different condi-
tions, such as the structure of metric spaces, the type of facilities, the number of the
facilities, etc., several models of facility games have been proposed. In the following
we summarize the major components in facility games.
Metric Space. So far only the following two types of metric spaces have been
considered in the literature.
Network models: In this model a graph G with each edge having a non-negative
weight is involved. We may think of G as being realized as a geometric graph (in
R3, for example) such that the weight of each edge represents its length. The metric
space Ω is the set of points of G, including both vertices of G and points on its
edges, and the distance d(x,y) between x ∈ Ω and y ∈ Ω is the length of a shortest
path connecting x and y in G. We usually write G in place of Ω in this case.
Euclidean metric space: In this case Ω = Rm for some integer m ≥ 1 and the
distance d is the usual Euclidean distance in Rm.
Number of facilities. Two cases have been distinguished in the literature:
k = 1: In this case the unique facility provides service to all agents.
k > 1: In this case a set Y of k locations is required, and an agent is served by the
closest facility, namely, a location achieving the distance d(Y, ti) := miny∈Y d(y, ti)
between agent i and Y .
Type of facilities. So far only the following two types of facilities have been
considered in the literature:
Desirable facility: In this case all facilities (e.g. library, school, etc.) are desirable,
and each agent wants to be as close to one of the facilities as possible. As such it
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is reasonable to assume that the utility u( f (x), ti) is a monotonically decreasing
function of d( f (x), ti) with only one peak. Since all facilities are desirable, we may
set cost( f (x), ti) := −u( f (x), ti) and call it the cost function of agent i. So far only
the simplest case where u( f (x), ti) =−d( f (x), ti) for each i has been studied in the
literature.
Obnoxious facility: In this case all facilities (e.g. garbage dump, etc.) are ob-
noxious, and each agent wants to be far away from all facilities. Thus the utility
u( f (x), ti) may be assumed as a monotonically increasing function of d( f (x), ti)
with only one dip. The simplest case where u( f (x), ti) = d( f (x), ti) for each i has
received most attention up to now.
According to whether the facilities are desirable or obnoxious, we call a facility
game classical or obnoxious; each agent aims to minimize her cost or maximize her
utility, respectively.
Strategy-proofness. A mechanism f is strategy-proof if for any x ∈ Ω n and
every i, we have u( f (x), ti) ≤ u( f (x−i, ti), ti), where (x−i, ti) is obtained from x by
replacing xi by ti but keeping all other coordinates. As a stronger requirement, f
is called group strategy-proof if for any x ∈ Ω n and I ⊆ N, we have u( f (x), ti) ≤
u( f (x−I , tI), ti) for at least one i ∈ I, where (x−I , tI) is obtained from x by replacing
xi by ti for every i ∈ I but retaining all other coordinates.
Type of mechanisms. Two different types of mechanisms have been studied:
Deterministic mechanism: This was discussed in the beginning of this section.
Randomized mechanism: A randomized mechanism is a function f : Ω n →
∆(Ω(k)) where ∆(Ω(k)) is the set of probability distributions over Ω(k). In the
simplest case, the expected value EY∼ f [d(Y, ti)] may be defined as the cost or the
utility of agent i in classical facility games or obnoxious facility games, respectively.
Objective function. The decision maker (or the mechanism designer) is inter-
ested in (group) strategy-proof mechanisms that also do well with respect to opti-
mizing a given objective function.
Similar to the k-median and k-center problems [8, 14, 15], for classical facility
games researchers have so far considered minimizing the social cost SC( f ,x) :=
∑ni=1 cost( f (x), ti) or the maximum cost MC( f ;x) := maxi=1,...,n cost( f (x), ti). Sim-
ilar to the k-maxisum and k-maximin problems [3, 31, 33], for obnoxious facil-
ity games researchers have considered maximizing the obnoxious social welfare
SW( f ;x) :=∑ni=1 u( f (x), ti) or the minimum utility MU( f ;x) :=mini=1,...,n u( f (x), ti).
In summary, a facility game consists of: a set N of n agents; a metric space
(Ω ,d) which may be continuous or discrete; a subset {t1, . . . , tn} of Ω , ti being
the true location of agent i; a set of k facilities to be installed at k (not necessarily
distinct) locations in Ω ; a utility function u : Ω(k)×Ω → R taking non-negative
values which usually relies on d( f (x), t), where x = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ Ω n, t ∈ Ω , and
f : Ω n →Ω(k) is a deterministic mechanism; and a non-negative objective function
F : Ω(k)×Ω n →R to be maximized, which is usually defined in terms of u( f (x), ti),
1 ≤ i ≤ n. We are interested in designing a mechanism f that is strategy-proof or
even group strategy-proof on the one hand, and on the other hand outputs a good
solution for any location profile in the sense that the approximation ratio
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sup
x∈Ωn
maxY∈Ω(k) F(Y,x)
F( f (x),x)
is as small as possible. Different specification of the components above gives rise
to different models for approximation (deterministic) mechanism design without
money for facility games.
In approximation randomized mechanism design, the distance function, the util-
ity function and the objective function are all random, and we can give a similar
framework by considering the expected values of the corresponding random vari-
ables.
3 Classical Facility Games
3.1 Single facility games
In the case k = 1, the preferences are single peaked in the sense that the outcome
is less preferred by each agent when it is further from her ideal locations. Begin-
ning with [20], single peaked preferences and their extensions have been extensively
studied in the social choice literature. In this subsection, we summarize known re-
sults on finding a facility location in different metric spaces that minimizes the social
cost or the maximum cost.
If the objective is to minimize the social cost, Procaccia and Tennecholtz [27]
proposed a GSP optimal mechanism which returns the location of the median agent
as the facility location when all agents are located on a path. This mechanism is GSP
since an agent can manipulate the output only by misreporting her location to be on
the opposite side of the median. Moreover, the median also minimizes the social
cost, because for any location with distance ε > 0 to the median, at most ⌊n/2⌋
agents are within distance ε to the facility and all other agents are away from the
facility by at least ε . Similarly, if the graph is a tree, Alon et al. [1] gave a mechanism
that outputs the median of the tree as the facility’s location. Such a mechanism is
also an optimal GSP mechanism.
When all agents are located on a graph G containing a cycle C, Schummer and
Vohra [29] showed that if a deterministic mechanism f : Gn → G is an SP mecha-
nism that is onto G, then there is a cycle dictator, that is, there exists i ∈ N such that
for all x ∈Cn, f (x) = xi. Based on such a characterization, Alon et al. [1] obtained
a tight SP lower bound of n− 1 on the approximation ratio for any graph G that
contains a cycle. For the randomized version, they designed a mechanism which re-
turns a facility location xi, i ∈ N, with probability 1/n. This mechanism is SP with
approximation ratio 2− (2/n) for any general graph. They showed further that such
a mechanism is GSP if and only if the maximum degree of the graph is two.
If the objective is to minimize the maximum cost, the problem of designing an SP
mechanism is simpler compared with deterministic mechanisms. Since Schummer
and Vohra [29] showed that strategy-proofness can only be obtained by dictator-
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ship, Alon et al. [1] considered the mechanism given by f (x) = x1 for all x ∈ Gn,
that is, agent 1 is a dictator. It can be proved that such a mechanism is a GSP
2-approximation mechanism. On the other hand, Procaccia and Tennecholtz [27]
showed that a deterministic SP mechanism cannot achieve an approximation ratio
better than 2 even if the underlying graph G is a path. Thus the dictatorship mecha-
nism of Alon et al. [1] has the best approximation ratio with respect to the maximum
cost. Procaccia and Tennenholtz [27] proved that a randomized SP mechanism has
approximation ratio at least 3/2 on a path. They also gave a matching GSP up-
per bound of 3/2 by using the Left-Right-Middle (LRM) Mechanism, which, for
a given x ∈ Gn, chooses mini xi and maxi xi with probability 1/4 respectively, and
chooses the midpoint of the interval [mini xi,maxi xi] with probability 1/2. When
the agents are on a circle, Alon et al. [1] proposed a randomized SP mechanism
with approximation ratio 3/2 that combines two mechanisms: the LRM mechanism
if the agents are located on one semicircle, and the Random Center Mechanism
otherwise. When G is a tree, they showed that there is a randomized SP (2− 2
n+2)-
approximation mechanism that, for a given x ∈ Gn, outputs xi for each i ∈ N with
probability 1/(n+ 2) and the center of the tree with probability 2/(n+ 2). They
further proved that 2−O
(
1
2
√
logn
)
is a lower bound on the approximation ratio for
any SP randomized mechanism.
Procaccia and Tennecholtz [27] considered a natural extension of the classical
single facility games, in which one facility should be located but each agent con-
trols multiple locations. As before, the objective is to minimize the social cost
or the maximum cost. However, the cost of an agent now depends on the objec-
tive function. If the objective is to minimize the social cost, the cost of agent i is
defined as cost(y,xi) = ∑wij=1 d(y,xi j), where y is the location of the facility and
xi = (xi1, . . . ,xiwi) is the location set controlled by agent i. If the objective is to min-
imize the maximum cost, the cost of agent i is cost(y,xi) = max j=1,...,wi d(y,xi j).
For the social cost, they directly applied the deterministic mechanism by Dekel
et al. [7] that returns the median med(x′) of x′ = (med(x1), . . . ,med(xn)). Dekel
et al. [7] also showed that this mechanism is a GSP 3-approximation mechanism
and provided a matching lower bound. Furthermore, Procaccia and Tennecholtz
[27] designed a simple randomized mechanism to return med(xi) with probabil-
ity wi∑ j∈N w j . This mechanism is SP, and when n = 2 its approximation ratio is
2+ |w1−w2|
w1+w2
. Subsequently, Lu et al. [17] extended the result about the approxima-
tion ratio to 3− 2min j∈N w j∑ j∈N w j for any n and obtained the lower bound 1.33 by solving a
related linear programming problem. For the maximum cost, they proposed a GSP
2-approximation deterministic mechanism and a (3/2)-approximation randomized
mechanism. Since the multiple location setting is the same as the simple setting
stated before when wi = 1, i ∈ N, any lower bound for the simple setting holds here
as well.
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3.2 2-facility games
When the objective function is the social cost and the network is a path, Procaccia
and Tennecholtz [27] showed that the mechanism that outputs an optimal solution
for a given x ∈ Gn is not strategy-proof. They gave the following GSP (n− 1)-
approximation mechanism: choose the leftmost and the rightmost points, and con-
structed an instance to show that 3/2 is a lower bound on the approximation ra-
tio for any SP deterministic mechanism. Later, Lu et al. [17] improved such lower
bound to 2, designed a randomized n/2-approximation mechanism, and explored a
lower bound of 1.045 for randomized mechanisms. Moreover, Lu et al. [18] proved
that the (n−1)-approximation deterministic mechanism given in [27] is asymptoti-
cally optimal. They constructed an instance on a path and explored the lower bound
(n−1)/2 on the approximation ratio by employing two key concepts: partial group
strategy-proofness and image set. In the case when all agents are on a circle, they de-
signed a GSP deterministic mechanism with an (n− 1)-approximation ratio which
asymptotically matches the lower bound (n− 1)/2. Lu et al. [18] also obtained an
SP 4-approximation randomized mechanism called the Proportional Mechanism:
the first facility is allocated uniformly over all reported locations; the second fa-
cility is assigned to another reported location with probability proportional to its
distance to the first facility.
If the objective is to minimize the maximum cost, only Procaccia and Ten-
necholtz [27] contributed some positive results in the case when all agents are on a
path. For the deterministic version, they applied the same deterministic mechanism
as the one for the social cost model. By exploring the characterization of the struc-
ture of the optimal solution, they proved that the approximation ratio of such a mech-
anism is 2, and provided a matching SP lower bound. Furthermore, they designed
a randomized SP 5/3-approximation mechanism. Compared with the deterministic
case, the randomized mechanism for this model is much more complicated and the
authors applied some new ideas: randomizing over two equal intervals, unbalanced
weights at the edges, and correlation between the two facilities. These strategies
play a crucial role in satisfying the delicate strategy-proof constraints and break the
deterministic lower bound of 2. The lower bound of any randomized SP mechanism
is proved to be 3/2.
3.3 k-facility games with k ≥ 3
For k-facility games with k ≥ 3, most known results focus on the objective of mini-
mizing the social cost. McSherry and Talwar [23] first used differentially private al-
gorithms as almost strategy-proof approximate mechanisms. The main advantage of
such an algorithm is that it can control any agent’s influence on the outcome so that
any agent has limited motivation to lie. McSherry and Talwar presented a general
differentially private mechanism that approximates the optimal social cost within
an additive logarithmic term. Unfortunately, the running time of this general mech-
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anism is randomized exponential-time. Subsequently, Gupta et al. [11] presented
a computationally efficient differentially private algorithm for several combinato-
rial optimization problems. Based on [23], Nissim et al. [25] considered imposing
mechanisms which can penalize liars by restricting the set of allowable post-actions
for the agents. They combined the differentially private mechanisms of [23] with an
imposing mechanism and obtained a randomized imposing SP mechanism with a
running time in k for k-facility location. The mechanism approximates the optimal
average social cost, namely the optimal social cost divided by n, within an additive
term of roughly 1/n 13 .
In contrast to [25], Fotakis and Tzamos [10] tried to design an SP mechanism
with standard multiplicative notion of approximation. They considered the winner-
imposing mechanism which chooses k reported locations of agents to build facilities.
If an agent’s reported location is chosen to put a facility, then she is served by this
facility and her service cost is the distance between this facility and her true loca-
tion. If an agent’s reported location is not chosen, then she is served by a facility
closest to her true location. Thus the winner-imposing mechanism can penalize an
agent without money only if she succeeds in gaining more benefit in the mechanism.
Fotakis and Tzamos proved that the winner-imposing version of the Proportional
Mechanism in [18] is an SP 4k-approximation randomized mechanism. Moreover,
they addressed the facility location game in which there is a uniform facility open-
ing cost, instead of a fixed number of facilities. The authority should place some
facilities so as to minimize the social cost and the total facility opening cost. For
this game, they showed that the winner-imposing version of Meyerson’s random-
ized algorithm in [21] is an SP 8-approximation mechanism. Meanwhile, they pre-
sented a deterministic nonimposing GSP O(logn)-approximation mechanism when
all agents are on a path. In addition, Escoffier et al. [9] considered a facility game
to locate n− 1 facilities to n agents. They studied such a game in the general met-
ric space and trees for the social cost and the minimum cost, and provided lower
and upper bounds on the approximation ratio of deterministic and randomized SP
mechanisms.
4 Obnoxious Facility Games
For obnoxious facility games on a path, the preferences are known as single-dipped,
meaning that the worse allocation for each agent is the one that places the facility
right by their home, and that locations become better as they are further away. In the
past a few years, a lot of work [2, 12, 13, 22, 26] was focused on characterizations
of the strategy-proofness for the single-dipped preference. Cheng et al. [6] initially
studied approximation design without money for obnoxious facility games with the
objective of maximizing the obnoxious social welfare. In this section, we survey
some known results in this domain.
Cheng et al. first proposed group strategy-proof mechanisms to locate one facility
with respect to different network topologies. In particular, if all agents are on a path,
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they viewed such a path as an interval with left endpoint a and right endpoint b.
Since this model is related to the literature on approximation algorithms for the 1-
maxian problem [4, 31, 32, 33] from an algorithmic perspective, it is well known that
one of the two endpoints must be an optimal facility location for x ∈ Gn. Thus they
regarded the two endpoints as the candidates for the facility locations and designed
a GSP 3-approximation deterministic mechanism, which outputs a if the number
n2 of agents on the right-hand side of the interval is larger than the number n1 of
agents on the left-hand side, and b otherwise. By a similar idea, they presented
two GSP deterministic mechanisms respectively when all agents are on a tree or a
circle, and proved that the approximation ratio of each mechanism is 3. Later, Han
et al. [12] provided the matching strategy-proof lower bounds for each model on
different networks. Furthermore, when all agents are on an interval, Cheng et al. [6]
also gave a randomized mechanism which returns a and b with probability α and
1−α , respectively, where α = 2n1n2n22
n21+n
2
2+4n1n2
. They proved that such a randomized
mechanism is GSP and has achievable approximation ratio 3/2. When all agents
are on a general network, a GPS 4-approximation deterministic mechanism and
a trivial GSP 2-approximation randomized mechanism were derived. In addition,
the deterministic mechanism was shown to be asymptotically optimal by using the
characterization of strategy-proofness for general networks [13].
Recently, Cheng et al. [5] considered a new model of obnoxious facility games
that has a bounded service range. In this model each facility can only serve the
agents within its service range due to the limited service ability. Each agent wants
to be far away from the facilities. On the other hand, she must stay within at least
one facility’s range, otherwise she can not receive any service. Cheng et al. first
studied the case when all agents are on an interval, which is normalized as [0,1],
and the service radius is some r with 1/2 ≤ r ≤ 1. Compared with the previous
model without service range, this new model is more complicated since more than
one facilities may be needed and it is no longer true that one of the endpoints must
be an optimal solution. According to the value of r, Cheng et al. selected different
candidates for the facility locations. To be specific, if 3/4≤ r ≤ 1, points r or 1− r
are designated as the facility locations; otherwise, they locate one facility at 1/2
or two facilities at 0 and 1 respectively. Thus they designed a GSP deterministic
mechanism and a GSP randomized mechanism. When 1/2 ≤ r < 3/4 or 3/4 ≤
r ≤ 1, the approximation ratio of their deterministic mechanism is 8r− 1 or 2r+12r−1 ,
respectively, and the approximation ratio of their randomized mechanism is 4r or
2r
2r−1 , respectively. Meanwhile, they also proved a lower bound for any strategy-
proof deterministic mechanism by constructing different instances, which is equal
to 4r− 1 if 1/2≤ r < 3/4, 1/(2r− 1) if 3/4≤ r < 5/6 and 3r− 1 if 5/6≤ r < 1.
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5 Conclusion
We reviewed some known results on approximation mechanism design without
money for facility games. By comparing our general framework in Section 2 and
what we surveyed in Sections 3 and 4, it should be clear that a lot of interesting prob-
lems remain open and different models may be considered by specifying the compo-
nents in the framework. For example, one may investigate various cases where the
space of locations is more involved, such as a multi-dimensional Euclidean space or
a specific network other than paths, trees and cycles.
For obnoxious facility games, except the results in [12] there are no other results
in the case when the objective is to maximize the minimum utility. Han and Du
proved that there is no any SP deterministic mechanism with finite approximation
ratio for this objective. We believe that results can be obtained by using the differen-
tially private algorithm mentioned in Section 3.3 to design almost SP mechanisms.
For facility games with a limited service ability, the only known result is about the
obnoxious facility game on interval [0,1] with a service range 1/2≤ r ≤ 1. It would
be interesting to investigate classical and obnoxious facility games with different
types of restrictions to service ability in different metric spaces. In particular, one
may consider the obnoxious facility game on [0,1] when 0 < r < 1/2. It seems
challenging to find a general SP mechanism corresponding to the value of r.
Finally, closing the gap between the lower and upper bounds on the approxima-
tion ratios of deterministic or randomized mechanisms for some models is also a
significant research problem.
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